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Abstract: Principlism has dominated contemporary Anglophone practical ethics 
often regarded as the most important methodological conception. Young biomedical 
scientists grow up learning to apply the “four principles”, an approach originally 
introduced in the USA by Beauchamp & Childress2 but soon accepted also in the 
UK with the support of Professor Raanan Gillon. The central idea of the method in-
volves, first identifying the relevant among the four moral principle(s), (beneficence, 
non maleficence, respect for autonomy and justice) that is (are) connected with a 
specific moral dilemma. Then, one follows procedures of balancing, specification 
and deductive application, as a bridge between the moral dilemma and the four prin-
ciples. Some attention is paid while balancing, to consequentialist considerations, 
and to other ethically significant concepts as the virtues and the emotions, but only 
incidentally. What is central in Beauchamp & Childress’s principlism is the adop-
tion of normative insights of common morality, holding the position of a theoretical 
justification for the methodological reasoning which will determine the solution of a 
specific moral problem.
The main ambition of the four principles approach and its main virtue is the clar-
ity of the method and consequently the ability to become comprehensive and easily 
applied. There are certain problems though in applying the method. Here, we are 
going to investigate the problem of relative priority of principles, i.e. which principle 
overrides the other when two or more of them are in conflict, seeking help by the 
Kantian division, in perfect and imperfect duties. But we must first answer the ques-
tion: Is the four principles approach, a method of moral objectivism as Beauchamp & 
Childress claim, or is it a method of moral relativism, as it is often argued by some of 
their critics? Only if our answer to the objectivity question is positive, can the main 
issue of priority be addressed, because an attempt at a determinate ordering wouldn’t 
mean anything in a relativist frame.
Keywords: principlism; four principles; Kantian ethics; autonomy; dignity; per-
fect duty; imperfect duty
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Ι. The four principles of Beauchamp & Childress between moral “imperialism” 
and moral relativism
3 
Beauchamp says that to solve the difficult or ‘hard’ cases we must use the four 
principles method plus some specification4. He defines specification as ‘a process of 
reducing the indeterminateness o moral norms to give them action guiding capacity, 
while retaining the moral commitments in the original norm’. Specification implies 
a mixture of general moral norms, which are abstract universal and thin in content, 
with the local or partial moralities which are robust non universal and thick in con-
tent. What Beauchamp & Childress aim at is a reflective equilibrium between the uni-
versal and the local, the general and the partial, the prescriptive norms of ‘common 
morality’ as they call it and the descriptive norms which are part of innumerable tra-
ditions, prejudices, religions that coexist in multicultural, liberal societies committed 
to tolerance, where their method is supposed to apply.   
Gillon claims that the four principles occupy the middle ground between moral 
relativism and what he dubs as moral ‘imperialism’. ‘Moral imperialism’ is supposed 
to refer to objectivism or realism or cognitivism or all together5. 
 Beauchamp & Childress and Gillon define the four principles as basic prima 
facie moral commitments, a term introduced by the English philosopher W. D. Ross, 
which means that the principle is binding unless it conflicts with another moral prin-
ciple- if it does we must choose between them6. Beauchamp defines the four prin-
ciples as follows: respect of autonomy- the obligation to respect the decision making 
capacities of autonomous persons, non maleficence – the obligation to avoid causing 
harm, beneficence- the obligation to provide benefits and to balance benefits against 
risks, and justice - obligation of fairness in the distribution of benefits and  risks7.
A first comment is that this particular account of autonomy is an individualis-
tically shrunken version, which weakens the concept’s weight. It could be claimed 
also, that it undermines the universality ambition of the four principles. Autonomy 
interpreted as a simple free choice and decision according to individual reasons, can 
give precedence to individual beliefs, religious prejudices, racist and sexist discrimi-
nations that exist in certain cultures and to other criteria that can easily undermine 
the ‘common morality’ which is the basis of the four principles. Is there such a thing 
as Gillon’s middle ground? Or is the midway between moral imperialism and relativ-
ism, an impossible mixture of objectivism and a relativistic interpretation of cultural 
difference?8 
Gillon says that the actual use made of the four principles approach can legiti-
mately vary from person to person, from culture to culture9. Here it seems that we 
have an unjustifiable collapsing of the distinction between descriptive and prescrip-
tive senses of common morality, prescriptive being the morality that prescribes what 
we should do and descriptive the morality commonly practiced by people. Is it pos-
sible that such a place as Gillon’s middle ground exists? For it to exist there must be 
a compromise between the two conflicting conceptions of objectivism and relativism 
and we are confronted by the following dilemma: 
Either principlism works properly only with western liberal and individualist 
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common moral intuitions because they represent universal and absolute moral stand-
ards that all other cultures should adopt. Or no usage of the four principles is un-
acceptable and moral judgments are internal to every particular group or culture or 
tradition. So you can use the four principles as you like, abandoning any claim of 
universality10.
It seems that Beauchamp & Childress and Gillon in trying to avoid the double 
trap  of moral relativism and moral ‘imperialism’ finally construct an incoherent 
model thick in status ( since it deals with practical moral issues) and thin in content 
(because it uses moral norms in a minimalistic sense)11. They claim that different so-
cieties may  diverge in their understanding of the principles but they are not supposed 
to diverge interminably. But without a theoretical ground that eliminates the indi-
vidualistic use of four principles in different ways convergence cannot be obtained.
The universality of the four principles approach could nevertheless be saved by 
granting autonomy its Kantian origin and enriching the American model of auton-
omy, as Dragona Monahou defines it (Unesco, Principles of Bioethics), with the Eu-
ropean model of dignity. By accepting that “autonomy is therefore the ground of the 
dignity of  human nature and of every rational nature” (GMM 4:436) and the second 
formulation of the categorical imperative “so act that you use humanity, whether  in 
your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as end and never 
merely as means” (GMM 4:429) the relativist cultural components of moral delibera-
tion subside, because this account of autonomy pervades all cultures with unreduced 
intensity. O’ Neill argues for the Kantian construal of autonomy in bioethics: for 
Kant autonomy is not relational, not graduated, not a form of self expression; it is a mat-
ter of acting on certain sorts of principles, and specifically on principles of obligation….
autonomy in thinking is no more -but also no less- than the attempt to conduct thinking 
on principles on which all others whom we address could also conduct their thinking12…. 
autonomy in action is no more -but also no less- than the attempt to act on principles on 
which all others could act13. 
Even if we grant the force of objections to the Kantian model of autonomy recom-
mended by O’Neill, we have to acknowledge the need that the four principles obtain 
a thicker content that will not allow individualized and diverging interpretations. 
ΙΙ. The four principles and the Kantian account of duties  
If we believe that the universality of the four principles model could be saved by 
the Kantian account of autonomy, then we can go on to our second question: are the 
four principles equal in importance? And if they are equal, how do we decide about 
their relative priority, when they conflict? We must answer this question in the con-
text of the Kantian autonomy solution, because no answer will have any meaning, 
if the universality claim of the four principles fails. If the reflective equilibrium that 
Beauchamp & Childress suggest is obtained by reflecting on morally thick communi-
ty or religious or even personal beliefs, in a relativist context, any principle may take 
priority over the other, and consequently this procedure does not have any special 
moral weight. By remaining in the Kantian context, we shall attempt to illuminate 
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first the problem of equality of the four principles and then examine the priority issue 
by comparing it to the Kantian division of necessary duty to oneself .. [and] to others or 
duty owed to them (GMM 4:429) and contingent (meritorious) duty to oneself … [and] 
to others (GMM 4:430). We are going to adopt respectively the commonly used terms 
“perfect” and “imperfect” duties. 
 Beauchamp & Childress have been accused of incoherence in their principlism, 
because although they claim that the four principles are equal, there is a tacit priority 
of autonomy, which Gillon defines as the ‘first among equals’ principle14. Gillon’ s 
definition has it’ s origin in the Roman ‘primus inter pares’15 conception and has been 
thoroughly criticized as incoherent by Dawson και Garrard16 arguing that in a general 
theory of prima fasciae duties, you cannot consider any principle to be coming first 
among equals. Gillon in a recent evaluation of the criticism mounted against the four 
principles theory since its first appearance, forty years ago, when Principles of Biomed-
ical Ethics was first published, and trying to highlight the importance of beneficence 
says: this obligation [beneficence] in my own view the core moral commitment of doctors 
–their core ‘Hippocratic’ objective or ‘Hippocratic’ moral commitment. … To the degree 
this commitment itself requires, in the case of autonomous patients, that their autonomy 
is respected, simply because people’s assessment of harms and benefits is in part subjective 
and idiosyncratic- so for doctors to be able to decide what course of action actually does 
provide net benefit with minimal harm, they need to consult their autonomous patients. 
And he adds: even if [autonomy] is accepted to be the ‘first among equals’ it remains 
‘among equals’ and may in particular cases and types of case  have to give way to one or 
more of the other three principles17. 
In the famous ‘four scenarios’ also (‘standard’ case of a Jehovah’s Witness, the 
‘child of a Jehovah’s Witness’, human organs trade, and genetic enhancement) 
Beauchamp’s solution18 in each case does not deserve the accusation of promoting 
the principle of autonomy. In Jehovah’s Witness case for example the principle of 
autonomy prevails. In the ‘child of a Jehovah’ s Witness’ (where a Jehovah’ s Wit-
ness  is refusing blood transfusion to his offspring that could save her life, and where 
the principles of the father’ autonomy and that of beneficence expressed through 
benevolent medical intervention to save the child’s life, are in conflict), the principle 
of beneficence comes first. In the human organs trade the principle of distributive 
justice, and finally in genetic manipulation the principle of non maleficence (harm of 
the next generations) is to be taken in account more seriously than the others. 
Let’s examine now what happens in the field of Kantian ethics. It seems that the 
problems of the division of duties into perfect and imperfect in Kantian literature, 
has ‘contaminated’ bioethics and the discussion about the priority of the principles 
in question, is parallel to that about the priority between perfect and imperfect duties 
when they conflict. In bioethics’ literature the terms ‘perfect’ and ‘imperfect’  are of-
ten used in relation with the principles, especially regarding the conflict of autonomy 
with beneficence. 
The dispute about Kantian perfect and imperfect duties is long. The most in-
fluential interpretation of the distinction is that perfect and imperfect duties have 
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a different status (duties of justice and duties of virtue, according to the classification 
proposed in his Metaphysics of Morals) and when they conflict the perfect precede as 
imperative and so the imperfect subside as weaker and optional. This classification 
is based on the schematic division in the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals: in 
accordance with their usual division into duties to ourselves and to other human beings, 
and into perfect and imperfect duties (GMM 4:421). Kant after exposing four examples 
of duties concludes: that the first is opposed to strict or narrower (unremitting) duty, the 
second only to wide (meritorious) duty (GMM 4:424).
The Kantian division has been interpreted in different ways. An interpretation 
is that of positive versus negative duties, negative being the ones that are defined by 
absolute prohibitions of actions, while positive are the ones that contain final ends 
and can be satisfied by many and different plans of action that can attain them. Kant 
maintains that a perfect duty does not accept an exception in favor of a predisposition 
while an imperfect duty accepts a certain field of free choice following the law. 
Another construal is that of an opposition between narrow and binding duties 
and wide and not binding. This construal is rooted in Kant’s claim that the ethical 
[imperfect] duties are of wide obligation, whereas duties of right  perfect] are of nar-
row obligation (GM 6:390). For example the imperfect duty of beneficence demands 
charity but it does not specify the kind or the time of charity that must be enacted. 
On the other hand perfect duties demand execution or omission of an action. They 
can also allow for latitude in the performance of an action (e.g. I can pay a ten dollar 
debt by two dollars coins or five etc.), but the action must always be performed19.
A third interpretation is of consequentialist origin. Jeffrie Murphy and J. S. Mill 
argue that the Kantian distinction is based on the correlative rights issue. Perfect du-
ties correlate with assignable rights that are violated if the duties are not honored; im-
perfect duties involve actions which one ought to do, but where no assignable rights 
are violated if one fails to act. Contracts constitute perfect rights in the sense that they 
generate correlative rights which render the duty narrow, while imperfect duties as 
beneficence do not generate correlative rights and has certain latitude in their execu-
tion20. For Mill, perfect duties coincide with principles of justice and he maintains 
that a right is something the possession of which ought to be defended by society.
Another interpretation that we will attempt here is based on Robert Louden’s 
Kant’s Impure Ethics, providing an original reading and interpretation of Kant’s eth-
ics. According to this interpretation we could characterize the perfect duties as ‘pure’ 
duties. Pure here means that they derive from free will and can be performed im-
mediately and without any action plan (that is why they are usually negative). The 
imperfect ones are ‘pure’ concerning their free will origin, but in their execution they 
demand, ‘impure’, empirical means, which are necessary, because who wills the end, 
also wills (necessarily in conformity with reason) the sole means to it that are within his 
control (GMM 4:417). Both duties as ends are objects of free will, and they contain a 
moral (objective) doctrine of ends (MM 6:385). But the imperfect underlie a technical 
subjective doctrine of ends containing the rules of prudence in the choice of one’s ends 
(MM 6:385) and so they have an element of individual empirical (impure) planning. 
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But whichever of the interpretations mentioned above we choose, it may prove 
inadequate because duties can anyway come into conflict in certain cases. There are 
plenty of examples and thought experiments in bioethics’ literature. One well known 
example is that of Thomas Nagel and goes like that: you have a car accident in the 
middle of nowhere, the two other passengers in your car are seriously injured, and the 
only way they can be saved is by being transported as soon as possible to a hospital. 
There is a house nearby with a car in the garage, where an old lady lives that takes care 
of her grandchild. When you go there and ask her for the keys of the car, she panics 
and locks herself up in the bathroom. Then you have the idea that the only way to 
make her give the keys is to strain her grandchild’s arm. Should you do something 
like that?21 Whatever our intuition may be for this case, it is very difficult here to 
apply the perfect imperfect distinction, because there is a conflict of a perfect positive 
with a perfect negative duty. Nagel will claim here in the context of his inquiry into 
the special nature of deontological constraints: it seems that that you shouldn’t twist the 
arm of a small child to get its grandmother to do something, even something important 
enough, so that you would not be required to forgo a comparable benefit in order to pre-
vent someone else from twisting a child’ arm22. 
There are cases where the duty of beneficence is narrow, like when people are 
drowning in front of you and you have the means to save some of them. You can’t 
leave all of them to drown claiming that the duty of beneficence is imperfect and you 
will save other people another time. That would be a violation of this duty which in 
these particular circumstances is narrow and imperative. 
Kant himself has ignited the debate with the famous example of the wannabe 
killer, who searches his victim in your house, and you must answer sincerely to his 
questions and not deceive him to save your friend, because you cannot violate your 
perfect duty not to lie. There are also thought experiments, such as that of the trolley 
that will kill three or four or five persons and to avoid it you must push a button and 
choose to kill only one, or a child or a priest or whatever a consequentialist calculus 
of good and bad demands. For all these experiments Nagel says that our deontological 
intuitions fail after a point of complexity23. 
Kant in MM claims that the general duty of virtue could be regarded as an im-
perfect duty, a duty to struggle for the purity of your motives which always will be 
greater than what you have already achieved, and that is so because we are free ration-
al beings but also embodied. Somewhere else in the MM he will say that the duty to 
oneself is a narrow and perfect one in terms of its quality; but it is wide and imperfect in 
terms of its degree, because of the frailty of human nature (MM 6:446 §22). So finally 
we have a) the duties of right which are ways of preserving and promoting the free-
dom which can be imposed externally and they are perfect and b) the duties of virtue 
which are ways of preserving and promoting the freedom which is self imposed (in-
ternally) (MM 379) and are 1) perfect according to their quality 2) imperfect accord-
ing to their degree. So, in conclusion, all duties are perfect according to their quality 
(duties of right and virtue). The imperfection that is detected in the duties of virtue is 
not one of their perscriptivity (both duties are positive) but of their operative ability, 
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taking into account the empirical limitations of Kantian moral anthropology24.  
Having Kant’s classification in mind, we can now examine the four principles in 
bioethics:
 The non maleficence duty is perfect as negative. In the case of balancing benefits 
against risks though, it becomes broader as we have sometimes to engage in conse-
quentialist calculations. But the scientific empirical instructions of medical practice, 
which are of consequentialist origin, can lead us. A moral dilemma could arise also 
when the patient’s evaluation is unreasonably different from that of the doctors, but 
there the principle of autonomy has to prevail. 
Justice (in distributing benefits and risks) has a priority among norms that reg-
ulate biomedical research and the delivery of its products. This principle though, 
together with the non maleficence principle, guide the discussions and law making 
of committees that decide about the obligations of scientific protocols and the appli-
cation of new technologies such as genetic enhancement, organ transplantation, and 
new reproductive techniques. Regarding these issues, its priority must be balanced in 
each case.
The beneficence principle seems to have a special status in bioethics, and so its 
prescriptivity differs in this context. In Kantian ethics as a whole, Barbara Herman 
claims that, respect of the integrity of the person of the other is obligatory, while 
failing to give help is not incompatible with respect of human action25. However, 
according to Rhodes, who criticizes principlism, according to Beauchamp & Chil-
dress’s common morality beneficence is an imperfect duty, for medicine beneficence 
is a defining duty, and doctors are committed to their patients’ benefit26. Beneficence 
is the objective of the biomedical sciences and so it constitutes a narrow duty of the 
scientists. It is the content of a contract signed between society and the scientific 
community and so it is an absolute duty because it is a duty of right. It is also nega-
tive, because it forbids the avoidance of its fulfillment (the doctor cannot choose to 
treat the patient or not), and narrow, because its execution is defined by scientific 
protocols. 
Finally, for the respect of autonomy principle, we can say that it is absolute and 
narrow and in the cases where it can be violated, like in decisions concerning minors, 
demented and other incompetent persons, the law orders that even then, possible 
autonomy must be acknowledged or otherwise respected in the face of surrogates.
In bioethics, all four principles can be regarded as perfect duties and they must 
be balanced not in prescriptivity, but in accordance to their relation to the specific 
problem we are confronted with. 
ΙΙΙ. Conclusion 
Beauchamp & Childress and Gillon’s four principles prove to resist the accusation 
of inconsistency and prioritization of autonomy, but we have concluded that they 
need to acquire a thicker content in order to secure the universality of the model. We 
think that the Kantian account of autonomy as “ the ground of the dignity of   human 
nature and of every rational nature” (GMM 4:436) could achieve that. The Kantian 
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perfect- imperfect duties distinction enlightened us on the nature of the principles 
as duties, but there are no direct analogies between the four principles and the four 
kinds of duties that Kant describes in GMM. All duties according to Kant are perfect 
in quality because of their free will origin, and the imperfection that he recognizes in 
the operative capacity of some duties, cannot be extended to bioethics because their 
operation in this area is widely predetermined by scientific and medical ethics proto-
cols, and little space is left for deliberation. We could say that the perfect character of 
a duty in its operation -because in quality all principles are perfect-, depends on the 
context within which it appears, and the special deontological constraints imposed 
by this context. 
The four principles with the addition of Kantian autonomy aim at securing the 
moral status of biomedical interaction and not only the legal shield of scientists, thus 
avoiding a limitation often criticized in the principlism of Beauchamp & Childress. 
With the Kantian enrichment of the method, the communicative element of in-
formed consent could be provided, and consent would be an agreement of two free 
sides cooperating towards a common end, which is produced by a common will, by 
a united will of both(GMM 6:272), and not just ‘ticking boxes’. Because “signing and 
ticking boxes can have legal weight but are deprived of moral weight” (Onora O’ Neill)27.
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